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CHAPTER I 
 
Research Design 
 
I. 1. Introduction 
I.1.A. Summary 
The conflict in the Southern Philippines between the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines (GRP) and two Muslim secessionist groups, Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), respectively depicts successful and 
the less successful mediation process. The mediated negotiation between the GRP and 
MNLF has already produced the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) that stands as the 
foundation for other more technical arrangements regarding the establishment of an 
autonomous region of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. The FPA restored the 
implementation of the 1976 Peace Agreement that had been put aside.
 
 
Less development has been reached in the mediated negotiation between the GRP and 
MILF. Thus far, both sides have not reached any peace agreement, even though they 
already signed a Declaration in 2010, stating a commitment to continue working on the 
peace process. However, in the late October 2011, MILF launched a series of attack, 
which was claimed by the group as ‘retaliation for the indiscriminate shelling of Muslim 
villages’ by the GRP.1 Shortly after that, the GRP launched an air strike on the area of 
Zamboanga Sibugay, where the MILF carried out one of its attacks.2  
 
Given the different outcomes between the two mediation platforms, it is quite appealing 
to look at the role of mediators in each mediation process. In fact, the nature of the 
mediator groups in this conflict, i.e. Organization of the Islamic Conference3 (OIC) and 
International Contact Group (ICG), are distinct from each other. The former is an 
established international organization, while the latter is an ad-hoc grouping formed 
specifically to facilitate the GRP – MILF peace talks. Indeed, when the characteristics are 
different, the behavior of each mediator group is bound to differ as well.  
 
Against this background, this thesis aims to study how mediator behavior influences the 
outcomes of a multiparty mediation. The answer to the question will be constructed 
through examining the lessons-learned from the two mediation platforms in the Southern 
Philippine conflict portrayed in the next chapters of this thesis. First, each mediation 
platform will be examined to discover both the advantages and disadvantages it brings to 
the mediation process, in reference to the behavior of the multiparty mediator. Multiparty 
mediator’s behavior, for the sake of this research, is composed of their standing vis-à-vis 
the negotiating parties as well as the coordination amongst the members of the mediation 
                                                 
1
 “MILF escalates attacks in Zambo Sibugay; 7 soldiers dead”, 
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?publicationSubCategoryId=63&articleId=739977, 15 May 2012, 
09:00 p.m. (CET) 
2
 “Philippines launches air attack on rebels”, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/10/26/Philippines-launches-air-attack-on-rebels/UPI-
80061319623500/, 15 May 2012, 09:15 p.m. 
3
 Since 28 June 2011, the name of the organization has been changed into Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation. 
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platform. Having identified the plus and minus points of each mediator platform, the next 
step is to extract some lessons out of it in order to envisage the best practice for coping 
with the Southern Philippine conflict and, if applicable, the other similar conflicts. 
 
For a brief timeline of the conflict and mediation process, as well as the highlight of the 
events discussed later, see, Annex of this thesis.  
 
I.1.B. Context 
The conflict between the GRP and the Moro insurgents in the Southern Philippines has 
been ongoing since 1972, following the armed attack by the MNLF that was initially 
pursuing the independence of Muslim Bangsamoro (the people of Moro in the Southern 
Philippines area) from the Philippine jurisdiction. In response, the Philippine government 
declared Martial Law to be implemented in the whole Philippines and fought the 
secessionist group with militaristic measures. In 1977-1978, the MNLF split into two 
groups, and the “new leadership” group declared itself as the MILF. 
 
The conflict has been protracted over time with sporadic attacks by the two groups. 
Along with the armed struggle, both groups have also been engaged in peace talks with 
the GRP. Today, there are two mediation processes going on between the government 
and the two secessionist groups, in two different frameworks.4 To coordinate all the 
conflict resolution attempts as well as to represent the GRP in the peace talks, a special 
office was set up in 1993, which is called the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the 
Peace Process (OPAPP), currently headed by Secretary Teresita Quintos Deles. 
 
The GRP-MNLF peace talks have been mediated by the OIC. In mediating the GRP and 
MNLF, the OIC established a special committee that had been transformed a few times, 
from the first Quadripartite Committee consisting of four OIC member countries to its 
latest form, i.e. the Peace Committee for the Southern Philippines (OIC-PCSP) consisting 
of twelve member states and the OIC Secretary General. Putting it on the context of this 
research, it was the Committee of Six (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal and Somalia) who worked on the peace talks during 1993-1996 resulting in the 
FPA. 
 
The GRP-MILF peace talks are mediated by Malaysia and the ICG. ICG is an ad-hoc 
group consisting of various states and international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), established to support the peace talks facilitated by Malaysian government. It is 
composed of four member states as well as four NGOs, i.e. Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Asia Foundation, Conciliation 
Resources, and Muhammadiyah, one of the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia. 
Malaysia started its mediator role in 2001, while the ICG was created in 2009.  
 
In the context of this research, mediation attempt by the OIC is considered successful 
because the GRP and MNLF have reached and now been implementing the 1996 FPA. 
On the other hand, mediation by ICG has not yet achieved a final peace agreement and, 
                                                 
4
 For further information, see Jacques Bertrand, “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 
1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pg. 50 
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regardless of the 2010 declaration to resume peace talks, the armed attack between the 
two parties still happened, sporadically, even until the late 2011. Along these lines, this 
thesis will focus its analysis on the mediation process by the OIC in 1993-1996 and by 
Malaysia and the ICG from 2001 until the present. 
 
 
I.2. Literature Review 
At the beginning, mediation study revolved around the argument that a successful 
conflict resolution is mainly determined by the substance of the peace proposals that 
satisfy both sides or, at least, are acceptable to them.5 It follows the logic behind the 
conflicting parties’ decision to go into negotiation or mediation, namely to formulate a 
win-win solution. Focusing only on the content of a peace proposal (or agreement when it 
is agreed by all parties), this approach does not take into account the process of the 
mediation effort. Accordingly, it tends to overlook the dynamics of the mediation process 
that may influence or even determine how a peace agreement is finally achieved. 
 
In reality, a peace agreement is never an independent case. Also, it is not rigidly a matter 
of content. There are other factors in a peace process that can influence, either positively 
or negatively, to the conclusion of the agreement. Scholars, then, start to take into 
account more the mediation process. This process-oriented approach is more dynamic 
than the end-oriented one, because the former is open for various discussions regarding 
the factors that may influence the outcome of a mediation process. One of the factors 
analyzed by scholars is that related to the timing or momentum, for instance, as 
elaborated by Zartman as well as by Crocker, et.al.
 
 
Zartman developed the idea that a negotiation or mediation is likely to succeed when the 
conflict is perceived “ripe” by the parties.6 A conflict is called “ripe” when the 
conflicting parties have reached a point of “mutually hurting stalemate”. In some cases, 
the parties are unable to see the ripeness, thus, the role of third-party mediator(s) is 
crucial in framing the conflict situation to be conducive for negotiation.  
 
Since the ripeness of a conflict only appears in the perception of the parties involved, 
mediators could help shape the mindsets of the conflicting parties that peaceful settlement 
through negotiation is the best possible solution; that further violence will only hurt both 
sides. Additionally, mediators could also help initiate the communication between parties 
when the situation between them is becoming so hostile. 
 
Crocker, et.al. raise the discussion about mediator “readiness”, which they define as 
“…the moment when a mediator has assembled the requisite resources, political backing, 
and institutional support – both domestically and among coalition partners – to move the 
negotiation process forward.”7 When both moments come together, mediation is likely to 
                                                 
5
 William I. Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”, The 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, no. 1 (September 2001) p. 8 
6
 Ibid.  
7
 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, “Rising to the Challenge of Multiparty 
Mediation; Institutional Readiness, Polilcy Context, and Mediator Relationships in Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
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succeed. However, it is a matter of fact that the moment of mediator readiness can differ 
from the moment of ripeness.8 In a situation when mediator gets ready only after the ripe 
moment for engaging the parties has passed, Chester, et.al. argue that the mediator should 
re-create the conditions to re-ripen negotiations without losing any of its institutional 
bases of support.  
 
There are two characters of the post-Cold War conflicts that impinge on the rising 
importance of third-party assistance in resolving the conflicts. First, most conflicts 
nowadays are civil wars between governments and ethnic rebel groups, making it often 
difficult to launch negotiation without the help of the third parties because the 
governments are usually reluctant to negotiate with the rebels. Second, the rebel groups’ 
demand for independence makes the situation more hostile for negotiation without the 
help, since sovereignty is indivisible and indispensable.9 Therefore, the essential role of 
mediator needs to be taken into account. 
 
This mediator-oriented approach focuses mostly on the mediation styles and strategies 
used to settle certain conflicts. In general, there are three mediation styles that may be 
adopted by a mediator, ranging from low to high intervention, i.e., procedural strategies 
and directive strategies, as identified by Touval and Zartman, as well as by Bercovitch 
and Houston.10 Beardsley, et.al. (2006) further link the mediation styles with the outcome 
of mediation process.11 A study by Bercovitch and Gartner (2009)12 combined the 
mediation styles with conflict intensity to look at the best method to apply in certain type 
of conflict. 
 
Dean Pruitt goes more into detail by considering mediator behavior as an important factor 
in the success of mediation.13 He elaborates a number of possible mediator’s role in peace 
talks, such as (1) structuring the situation, (2) developing working relationship, (3) 
caucusing/shuttle diplomacy, (4) gathering information to understand the underlying 
interests, (5) reframing the issues so as to make the parties more amenable to solution and 
(6) generating solutions. Pruitt also mentions “creative mediation”, which means that a 
mediator should do whatever feasible – and not only limited to what is written on papers 
                                                                                                                                                 
Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.), Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), p. 679 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Nowadays, larger and/or special autonomy as well as federalism are being more widely considered as a 
“middle-ground” solution, as more states are willing to offer these options to the the rebels, ethnic groups 
or whatever they may be labeled as. 
10
 See Touval and Zartman (1985 dan 1996), Bercovitch and Houston (2000) or Bercovitch and Gartner 
(2009) 
11
 Kyle C. Beardsley, et.al., “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes” in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. 50, No. 1 (February, 2006) 
12
 Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner, “Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some 
Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation” in Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund 
(eds.), International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings (New York: Routledge, 2009), pg. 
27 
13
 Dean G. Pruitt, “Mediator Behaviour and Success in Mediation” in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), Studies in 
International Mediation (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), ch. 3 
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– to solve the conflict. In this sense, a mediator should come with as many scenarios as 
possible. Furthermore,  
 
Pruitt also argues that mediator’s power and status can be employed as a positive trait 
vis-à-vis conflicting parties to further the peace process. Along this line, Bercovitch and 
Gartner also propose a basic reasoning for mediator’s behaviour. They argue that 
mediator characteristics and their standing vis-à-vis the conflicting parties are important 
determinants of the outcome; mediator must be seen impartial, acceptable to all 
disputants and deserving of their trust.14   
 
Moving away from the traditional point of view that mediators are heavily focusing on 
facilitating the conflicting parties, Sinisa Vukovic argues that a mediator can go beyond 
such a neutral and impartial position.15 In this regard, mediators are considered as an 
active party whose particular characteristics become instrumental for the success of 
mediation.  
 
A previous study by Albert W. Harris focuses on the accommodating behaviors that 
conflicting parties might take, by looking at the case of “civil wars” in the Philippines 
and Indonesia.16 A minimum concern is given to the role of international mediators in 
helping governments negotiate with insurgencies. In conclusion, Harris argues that in the 
case of Philippines, there is no agreement between the constituencies in domestic level, 
which makes the agreement reached between the government of the Philippines and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) cannot be implemented. While in Indonesia, the 
constituencies accept the agreement concluded by the government and Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (GAM).17 
 
Another related study by Jacques Bertrand focuses only on the peace process with the 
MNLF, particularly on the weakness of the peace agreement between the government and 
the MNLF.18 Bertrand criticizes the 1996 Peace Agreement to have certain flaws, such as 
it’s failure to address the issue of land rights as well as to involve other stakeholders in 
Mindanao particularly the non-Muslims. In addition, Bertrand also thinks that the MNLF 
leadership has failed to address the issue of corruption and mismanagement within itself. 
In the end, Bertrand suggests that the future of peace in the Southern Philippines is more 
likely to flourish if the MNLF and MILF peace process are linked in some manner. In 
this regard, he proposes, a potential agreement between GRP and MILF should include a 
renewed strategy to accommodate both the MILF and MNLF.19 
 
                                                 
14
 Bercovitch and Gartner, op.cit., p. 26 
15
 See, Siniša Vukovic, “International Mediation in Focus: Strategies and Bias Expanded” in Cooperation 
and Conflict, vol. 46, no. 1 (March 2011) 
16
 Albert W. Harris, “Coming to Terms with Separatist Insurgencies” in Negotiation Journal, Vol. 26, No.3 
(July 2010) 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 See further, Jacques Bertrand, “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace 
Agreement Is Fragile” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Spring, 2000) 
19
 Bertrand, op.cit, p. 19 
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These studies address two platforms of a conflict separately, while both must have 
connections to each other, as eventually suggested by Bertrand in his piece. Regardless of 
the fact that MNLF and MILF are two separate groups and, therefore, have different 
stances regarding the conflict settlement, they originally have many things in common in 
their struggle. In this manner, the existing studies on the Southern Philippines conflict do 
not provide a comprehensive process-tracing of both mediation platforms. Thus, a new 
study is necessary to explore what lessons can be learned from both MNLF and MILF 
mediation platforms, in order to produce a more thorough understanding towards a 
successful multiparty mediation process. 
 
All in all, the prior studies and the existing theoretical framework within the mediator-
oriented approach have provided the tools for analyzing how mediators stand vis-à-vis 
the conflicting parties. All the elements together, namely mediation styles, strategies, 
behavior, power and status (standing) as well as impartiality, shape the overall 
characteristics of a mediator. However, fewer studies look at how a mediator stands vis-
à-vis the other mediators within the same mediation platform – here, in the context of 
multiparty mediation.  
 
Crocker, et.al. acknowledge that managing various actors in multiparty mediation is not 
an easy matter,20 but do not sufficiently elaborate on the dynamics among the mediators 
themselves. In general, there is still a big gap between mediator – conflicting parties and 
mediator – mediator relations. An attempt to fill this gap is a study by Iji and Fuchinoe. 
 
Focusing on the importance of cooperation and coordination between mediators, Iji and 
Fuchinoue highlight two types of coordination in multiparty mediation, namely (a) 
among individual third-party initiatives, and (b) by lead mediators.21 In this regard, Iji 
and Fuchinoue argue that: 
 
“…[w]hen states engage in joint mediation, their roles as mediators, which are 
affected by their independent policy interests, would interact with each other and 
bring forth specific types of positive interconnections.”22  
 
Iji and Fuchinoue furthermore argue that different interconnectedness would likely to 
happen in other sets of mediators, such as in the collaboration of states and international 
organization.23 In conclusion, it is also proposed that lead international mediators are 
likely to be able to effectively exercise coordinating functions, particularly when they are 
accepted as a chief coordinator by the conflicting parties as well as other mediators.24  
 
There is limited study that comprehensively analyzes how mediators behave towards the 
conflicting parties as well as towards each other at the same time. In fact, the relationship 
between mediators (in a multiparty mediation) significantly impacts on how they stand 
                                                 
20
 See, Introduction chapter in Crocker, Hampson and Aall (eds.), op.cit.  
21
 Iji & Fuchinoue, “Toward a Better Understanding of Multiparty Mediation in International Relations” in 
Hiroshima Peace Science, Vol. 31 (2009), pp. 157-160 
22
 Ibid., p. 158 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid., p. 160 
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vis-à-vis the conflicting parties. A study connecting the mediator’s behavior towards each 
other and towards the parties is necessary because it will give in-depth as well as hands-
on explanations, for instance, concerning how mediators could make use of their 
numbers, in order to effectively settle a conflict.  
 
The case of the Southern Philippines conflict is also quite interesting, as it features two 
groups of mediators with different natures. It is expected that studying the case would 
give insight of what kinds of behavior will make a successful mediation and vice versa. 
 
 
I.3. Theoretical Framework 
This research will apply the existing theories regarding mediator standing and strategies 
and also coordination between mediators in a group, which together shape the mediator 
behavior as a whole. In general, a mediator needs to have a good standing in its relations 
with the negotiating parties, because the standing defines how the parties value the 
mediator and its role in the peace process and, therefore, influences the parties’ 
compliance to the mediator’s strategy in the attempt to conclude a peace agreement. 
Clearly, a mediator needs to behave in a way that comforts both negotiating parties and 
maintain their trust. Another essential behavior in multiparty mediation, which is not 
necessary in single-party mediation, is maintaining a good working relationship amongst 
members of the mediation platform. Otherwise, an internal tension amongst the mediators 
themselves may occur and potentially frustrate the whole mediation process.
 
 
I.3.A. Mediator Standing and Strategies 
According to Bercovitch and Gartner, mediation may be done by any actor – may it be 
individuals, states, regional or international organizations or institutions – with resources, 
standing or interest.25 In the case of mediation in the Southern Philippine conflict, there 
are basically two groups of multiparty mediator, i.e. the OIC Committee of Six, which 
represents a group of states and the ICG, an ad-hoc group consisting of states and NGOs. 
 
In order to create peace among the negotiating parties, mediators should have power to 
push or influence to persuade each party, not only to come into negotiation, but also to 
reach a peace agreement. A peace agreement is one necessary indicator of success of a 
negotiation process, as it provides a de jure commitment to the conflict settlement and 
foundation for further technical arrangements. The “power” and “influence” of the 
mediator may well be defined by the term “standing”. 
 
Mediator characteristics and their standing vis-à-vis the disputing parties are important 
determinants of the outcome; mediator must be seen impartial, acceptable to all 
disputants and deserving of their trust.26  Furthermore, status can derive from the standing 
of the organization with which the mediator is affiliated; Mediator status also contributes 
to mediator effectiveness.27 Concisely, mediator standing comes from its own character 
as well as from the negotiating parties’ recognition. 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., p. 22-23 
26
 Bercovitch and Gartner, op.cit., p. 26 
27
 Pruitt, op.cit., p. 51 
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In connection with mediators that consist of many actors, Crocker, Hampson and Aall 
mention that the credibility of multiparty mediators  
 
“…depends on [1] how important it is to the conflict parties to have a multilateral – 
not state-based – stamp of approval, [2] the mediator’s ability to satisfy the 
organization’s member states and [3] their capacity to move their sometimes 
cumbersome organizations along.”28 
 
As indicated earlier, there are three fundamental mediation strategies along a continuum 
ranging from low to high intervention that may be adopted by a mediator, i.e. 
communication-facilitation, procedural strategies and directive strategies.29 The choice of 
mediation strategy depends on the standing of the mediators vis-à-vis conflicting parties. 
The higher the mediator’s standing is, the more flexible the mediator could move from 
one continuum of strategy to another, with concern to what is needed in a certain 
situation and context. 
 
I.3.B. Coordination in Multiparty Mediation 
A new study by Crocker, et.al. comes to a conclusion that in order to succeed, mediators 
in a team should coordinate themselves and make sure that they create coherence 
together.30 The bottom line of their argument is that how the mediators organize 
themselves is related to, and will affect, how the mediators behave towards the 
conflicting parties. This is possible because by coordinating quite well, it will reduce the 
possible liabilities of multiparty mediation. Crocker et.al. identify a number of liabilities 
of multiparty mediation, inter alia, the lack of common vision and the possibility of 
mixed message, as well as “forum shopping” – a situation where each mediator offers a 
different forum to negotiate with any of the conflicting parties. Shortly, these liabilities 
will come as a result if mediators do not coordinate themselves well. 
 
The arguments supportive to multiparty mediation indicate that with more actors as 
mediator, there will be more ideas and avenues coming up. More actors also mean more 
resources and standing, which will provide the mediators with more various options and 
strategies. This will only happen if the members downplay their differences and 
individual interests and come with a common effort instead. A well coordinated 
multiparty mediation will result in more resources to utilize and more coordinated 
interests.  
 
As mentioned by Stedman, and further reemphasized by Iji and Fuchinoue, in order for 
mediators to be effective, they must speak with one voice.31 The way to do it is, inter alia, 
by having a mediator to take the lead. The role of a “chief” mediator in the team is also 
important to carry out the coordinator rule. It is further suggested that the presence of 
lead international mediators are likely to be able to effectively exercise coordinating 
functions through what might be termed the “coordination mechanism”, when they are 
                                                 
28
 Crocker, et.al. (eds.), op.cit., pp. 11-12 
29
 Bercovitch & Gardner, op.cit., pg. 27 
30
 See, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, “A Crowded Stage: Liabilities and Benefits of Multiparty Mediation” 
in International Studies Perspectives Vol. 2, No.1 (February 2001) 
31
 Iji and Fuchinoue, op.cit., p. 160 
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accepted as a chief coordinator by the disputing parties as well as other mediators and are 
never seriously challenged in that regard.32 
 
I.3.C. What makes a good multiparty mediation?  
Linking the two aforementioned theories, a multiparty mediation is likely to result in the 
conclusion of a peace agreement if the mediator has a good standing and are well-
coordinated. In the context of mediators in a group or organization, standing can be 
derived from the power and status of the group or organization and also be determined by 
the level of coordination and interconnectedness among the members. Equally important 
with mediator’s own modality and that of the organization, a recognition from the 
negotiating parties also defines their standing. 
 
Furthermore, as indicated earlier, a high standing of a mediator enables them to be more 
flexible in using the available strategy options, depending on what is needed in a certain 
situation. Mediator with a low standing can only possibly exert the facilitation strategy, 
but with a high standing, it may at a certain point uses procedural and even directive 
strategy. Finally, it is expected that with a wider range of strategy options, a mediator is 
likely able to bet the negotiating parties conclude a peace agreement. 
 
The summary of the theories linkage can be seen in the scheme below: 
 
Higher 
More flexible in 
strategy options 
Higher level of 
dependence from the 
parties, making them 
feel more pressure to 
reach an agreement 
without fiercely 
doing so. 
 
Expected result: 
More likely to reach a 
peace agreement 
(Theory 1) 
 
Power and the status 
of the group or 
organization they 
belong to 
 
Recognition from 
the parties (the level 
of acceptance, 
agreed and trusted 
by both sides, 
impartiality) 
(Theory 2) 
 
Coordination and 
interconnectedness 
among mediators in 
a group or 
organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mediator’s 
Standing 
 
Lower 
Less flexible in 
strategy options 
Expected result: 
Less likely to reach a 
peace agreement 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Ibid. 
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I.4. Research Question 
This research will examine the question: “what are the strengths and weaknesses of the 
multiparty mediation platforms in the Southern Philippines conflict; and how does the 
mediators’ behavior determine the success or failure to reach a peace agreement?” 
 
 
I.5. Hypothesis 
The existing theory, as mentioned before, explains that a higher standing of a mediator 
leads to a better position to settle the conflict. In a multiparty mediation, coordination is 
also likely to help further the settlement of a conflict. Accordingly, this research proposes 
hypothesis that “mediators with higher standing, i.e. those that are well-coordinated and 
supported by the power and status of the organization are more likely to succeed in 
helping the parties to come into a peace agreement.”  
 
 
I.6. Operationalization of Concepts 
I.6.A. Mediator behavior 
Bercovitch and Gartner do not make a distinction between mediator behavior and 
strategies. Furthermore, they suggest that mediator behavior should be conceptualized by 
the activities in terms of specific strategies. Thus, in their conception, behavior is simply 
measured by the level of intervention of the mediators in the conflict. However, for the 
purpose of this research, the concept of behavior is expanded. Two sides of mediator 
behavior are taken into account, as follows: 
(1) Mediator behavior towards each other, which will be analyzed through how they 
organize and coordinate themselves as a team of mediator; and 
(2) Mediator behavior towards negotiating parties, which will be analyzed through their 
standing vis-à-vis the parties as well as the strategies applied in carrying out the 
mediation tasks. 
 
I.6.B. Successful mediation 
Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas and Wilkenfeld mention three outcomes that are relevant to 
international crisis resolution, namely (1) achievement of a formal agreement, (2) post-
crisis reduction of tensions between crisis actors and (3) the abatement of the crisis.33 
Those indicators are useful to measure the success of mediation. In this research, a 
mediation is considered successful if it leads to the achievement of a formal agreement. 
On the other hand, it is considered failed if it does not even abate the conflict.  
 
 
I.7. Case Selection Strategy 
This research is based on the notion that mediator behavior in a multiparty mediation is 
the determinant factor in resolving a conflict. Thus, it is necessary to study two processes 
of multiparty mediation in similar conflict settings, like the Southern Philippine conflict. 
Unexpectedly, similar conflict settings in the Southern Philippines do not lead to the 
same result of mediation attempts; one has come with the conclusion of a peace 
agreement, while the other not thus far. 
                                                 
33
 Kyle C. Beardsley, et.al.,  op.cit., p. 66 
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The conflict in Southern Philippines is an example of multiparty mediation. It is rather 
difficult to find scholarly work that elaborates the two mediation platforms at the same 
time. A study by Jacques Bertrand focuses only on the peace process with the MNLF, 
particularly on the weakness of the peace agreement between the government and the 
MNLF.34 It leaves room to further study both platforms at one time, in order to produce a 
more thorough understanding of how each mediator group behaves. 
 
 
I.8. Data Collection 
This research will mainly rely on literature study, which will be done throughout the 
whole process of this research. In this regard, it is significant to study the agreements 
signed, official documents issued and statements made by officials of the government of 
the Philippines, MNLF, MILF, as well as the OIC and ICG. This sort of source is useful 
to follow the mediation stages and meetings, as well as to find how the mediators 
organize themselves and how they are seen by the parties. 
 
As a supporting source, it is necessary to look at opinion pieces of the individuals who 
have practical experience in or knowledge about the conflict. This type of source is 
usually unofficial in nature but can actually give an insider’s story. 
 
In addition, reliable Philippine-based and international online newspapers will also help 
give information, particularly with regard to the coverage of important occasions as well 
as to the comments made by the negotiating team members following certain 
circumstances, either progress or setback in the course of the mediation process. 
 
 
I.9. Methods of Analysis 
This research will apply process tracing through the two mediation platforms in the 
Southern Philippines conflict. The process tracing is mainly aimed at explaining how 
each mediator group works in the Southern Philippines by implementing the prevailing 
theory. This research is well-suited with process tracing because it enables an in-depth 
analysis of the case, particularly concerning how a better coordination leads to successful 
mediation.   
 
In addition, this research will also take into account the lessons learned from the 
mediation practices on the ground. Thus, this research might come with new ideas that 
are complementary to the existing ones concerning mediator behavior. 
 
 
I.10. Scope and Limitations 
This research is basically expected to provide a thorough understanding of the mediator 
behavior in the Southern Philippines conflict. Given the different characters of the two 
mediator groups, this research is also expected to explain why one group of mediator is 
more successful than the other, mainly by looking at how the mediators in a group behave 
                                                 
34
 Bertrand, op.cit. 
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towards each other. Thus, the scope of this research is quite specific to the conflict in the 
Southern Philippines.  
However, for further study, this research can also be used as a basis, for instance, to do 
comparative study of mediator’s behaviour with other similar conflict. To certain extent, 
this research is also expected to provide policy-makers, particularly those involve in 
conflict resolution activities, with some recommendations regarding mediator’s 
behaviour that is necessary to further the settlement of a conflict. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
1996 Final Peace Agreement: A Successful Mediation by the OIC Committee of Six 
 
 
“[T]he success of the GRP-MNLF final 
peace agreement is rightfully viewed here 
as a major diplomatic trophy of the OIC.” 
~ Blas F. Ople, former Foreign Secretary 
of the Republic of the Philippines 
 
 
Since its creation in 1972, the MNLF had pursued both armed struggle and diplomatic 
approach in order to separate from the Philippines and create an independent Bangsamoro 
state. The use of military forces was dominant at the beginning of its struggle and 
following the failure of 1976 Tripoli Agreement, as will be explained later on. The 
signing of Jeddah Accord in the 1987 had not only terminated the hostility between the 
GRP and MNLF, but also had opened the avenue to the long-lasting peace until today. 
 
This chapter will further elaborate the successful attempt by the OIC Ministerial 
Committee of the Six in mediating the peace talks between the GRP and MNLF. The 
mediation process that took place from 1993 to 1996 had resulted in the signing of the 
Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between both parties on 2 September 1996.  
 
With the conclusion of such a highly essential document, the mediation process by the 
OIC is considered successful. As will be presented below, the FPA is a major document 
because not only did it formally cease the armed conflict between the GRP and MNLF, 
but also provide a way in for the peace process between the GRP and MILF. Especially 
after the breakdown of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the FPA had renewed the hopes for a 
peaceful solution in the Southern Philippines. 
 
II.1. The Failure of 1976 Peace Agreement: First Phase of OIC Mediation 
Following the first armed attack by the MNLF under the leadership of Nur Misuari in the 
end of 1972, the GRP would use military approach as an attempt to stop the movement. 
In order to give more power to its struggle, the MNLF also sought international support 
by intensively doing diplomatic activities, especially with the OIC. MNLF’s diplomacy 
quickly drew the OIC’s attention, owing to the Islamic identity shared by the two. As a 
result, the OIC Summit in 1974 accepted the MNLF delegates delivering an “appeal 
letter” stating their wish for the OIC’s recognition and support in their battle for an 
independent Muslim state.35 In 1977, the OIC granted the MNLF an observer status in the 
organization.  
 
The OIC helped facilitate the pre-negotiation phase, which was basically focused on 
bringing both conflicting parties to the negotiation table. According to Dupont and Faure, 
pre-negotiation phase copes with the obstacles to negotiation as well as hurdles in 
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negotiation.36 The main obstacle to kick off the negotiation was the lack of 
communication between both sides, because of the mutual distrust. On one hand, the 
MNLF perceived the GRP as corrupt, unfair and impeding its struggle for self-
determination. On the other hand, the GRP perceived the MNLF’s movement as a 
rebellion, thus, it posed a threat to national security and integrity.  
 
The distrust between the two parties was getting even higher following the failure to 
implement the 1976 Peace Agreement. Given the circumstances, a third party 
intervention was very important to bridge the communication between the GRP and 
MNLF, as well as to introduce the way in to the peaceful conflict resolution. In this 
regard, without the OIC’s recognition of the MNLF as well as its pressure to the GRP at 
the first place, the peace talks between the two conflicting parties might not have begun 
and the armed conflict would possibly have remained.  
 
Still in the pre-negotiation phase, by introducing the peace talks to both conflicting 
parties, the OIC also helped reframing the conflict. Through a Joint Communiqué, the 
Foreign Ministers of the Organization called for “a political and peaceful solution ... 
within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Philippine.”37 While recognizing the MNLF’s struggle earlier, through this 
Communiqué, the OIC also gave recognition to the Philippines’ sovereignty.  
 
By accommodating both sides’ aspiration and interests, the OIC was trying to derive the 
leverage to be the formal mediator. Here the OIC reframed the conflict situation in such a 
way that peaceful resolution would take place with an already projected solution, i.e. to 
give autonomous status to the Moro. Along these lines, the option for Moro’s 
independence had clearly been taken away, as the national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Philippines were explicitly mentioned in the Communiqué. In addition, 
the reframing of the most feasible solution was also an effort to change both side’s stance 
from a far spectrum to a closer “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA) – a 
term commonly used in mediation study in embodying an “imaginary zone” of potential 
agreement where the stance of each party meets; the smaller the BATNA is, the closer the 
negotiating parties to concluding a peace agreement. 
 
The first formal talks between the GRP and MNLF, mediated by the OIC Committee of 
Four (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia), took place in Jeddah in January 
1975.38 The series of subsequent meetings finally resulted in the signing of the Peace 
Agreement in Tripoli, Libya, on 23 December 1976. The Tripoli Agreement is the first 
document signed through the peace process. The Agreement basically stipulated the 
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cease-fire arrangements and tentative terms for a peace settlement.39 The Agreement also 
stipulated autonomy for 13 provinces in Mindanao (Southern Philippines).40 
 
However, the Agreement quickly fell short over the details in the implementation. The 
GRP insisted that a referendum was required to legalize the autonomy status, which was 
considered unnecessary by the MNLF. Accordingly, the GRP proceeded with the 
plebiscite and decreed the creation of two autonomous regions, which was then rejected 
by the MNLF.41 The failure to implement the Tripoli Agreement was obviously a setback 
in the peace process. Not surprisingly, it triggered violent conflicts to reoccur. During this 
period, the internal friction and breakup within the MNLF escalated. As a result, Salamat 
Hashim, the former Vice Chairman of MNLF decided to separate from Nur Misuari’s 
organization and established the MILF in 1977. 
 
During this phase of mediation, Libya took the lead even though the leadership position 
was never officially mandated. Libya’s de facto leadership is evident through the fact that 
it hosted the signing ceremony of the 1976 Peace Agreement as well as through the active 
personal role of Muammar Gaddhafi, former Leader of Libya. According to a study by 
S.P. Harish, Libya made threats to do some disadvantageous actions against the GRP if a 
peace agreement were not concluded immediately.42  
 
In contrast, Libya gave support to the MNLF’s armed struggle, albeit the Philippines’ 
sovereignty and territorial integrity had been officially recognized in the Joint 
Communiqué of the OIC Ministers. Besides the underground supply of weapons and 
money to support the MNLF’s armed struggle, Libya’s de facto backing for the MNLF 
was obvious when the country hosted Nur Misuari on his exile in the 1980s.43  
 
Earlier, the GRP’s decision to go into peace talks with the MNLF was also taken under 
the threat of an oil embargo by the OIC member countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. 
Another factor that pulled the GRP into the negotiation table was, for sure, the positive 
recognition of its sovereignty by the OIC. Regardless of Libya’s actual support to the 
MNLF, it was obvious that the OIC member states rejected the idea of separatism and 
would stand for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 
Libya is said to dominate the mediation process and even overshadow the other OIC 
members.44 Furthermore, the use of political threats, inter alia to let the MNLF return to 
violent conflict if the GRP were not in favor of concluding a peace agreement, 
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demonstrates Libya’s superiority behavior over the negotiating parties.45 It also derived 
the standing from the OIC’s high leverage at that particular time. However, Libya’s 
‘over-directive’ strategy as well as its support to the MNLF made itself and the overall 
mediation process lost credibility shortly. As a result, the OIC Committee of Four failed 
to keep the GRP and MNLF in the negotiation table upon the difference of agreement 
interpretation by each side. 
 
A high leverage is useful for putting pressure on the conflicting parties to negotiate when 
they are actually unwilling to. In this manner, the OIC’s high leverage over both GRP 
and MNLF in that particular time was vital for the peace talks to take hold. However, 
exerting too much pressure, at the same time, would create distrust on the mediator, 
especially from the negotiating party that feels treated unfairly. Apparently, the high 
leverage of the OIC at the beginning of mediation did not make the 1976 Peace 
Agreement last long enough. Hypothetically, if Libya and other OIC members could have 
maintained their standing, they would have been able to resume peace talks at any point 
when disagreement between the GRP and MNLF took place.  
 
 
II.2. The 1996 Peace Agreement and the Road to Full Implementation  
 
Apart from the immediate recurrence of armed conflict and the return of MNLF to its 
original demand to separate from the Philippines, the breakdown of the 1976 Tripoli 
Agreement gave a way for the OIC to come with revised initiatives. However, it took 
quite a while until the OIC brokered the GRP-MNLF peace talks once again. It was most 
probably because the OIC had learned from its past experience that mediating with force, 
as done by Libya, would bring more harm than good. So, the OIC waited for the well-
timed momentum to restart its mediation efforts. 
 
Eventually, the toppling down of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1985 gave the 
momentum for the peace talks to resume, as the MNLF might put a better hope on the 
new regime. A political goodwill was shown by Marcos’ successor, President Corazon 
Aquino, inter alia through the proposal for the creation of an “Autonomous Region for 
Muslim Mindanao” (ARMM),46 upon which a plebiscite was held in 1989. In addition, 
the MNLF’s power had also been rapidly declining, especially during the early 1980s.47 
The high escalation of conflict during 1977-1983 exhausted both GRP and MNLF, also 
leading them to sign a ceasefire agreement on 5 September 1986.48  
 
It was very timely for the OIC to step back in the peace process. Taken as a whole, the 
favorable circumstances gave confidence to both parties that peace talks were the most 
                                                 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 The legal basis for the creation of ARMM is the Organic Act for the ARMM (Republic Act No. 6734 of 
1988) 
47
 See further, Ivan Molloy, “The Decline of the Moro National Liberation Front in the Southern 
Philippines”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1988) 
48
 For a brief chronology of the conflict escalation during the abovementioned period, see, for instance, 
http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/philippinesmoro-national-liberation-front-
1968-present/, accessed on 20 May 2012, 08:00 p.m. 
 17 
desirable solution to their conflict. This momentum was tactfully employed by the OIC to 
facilitate meetings between the GRP and MNLF. The signing of the Jeddah Accord on 3 
January 1987 marked the MNLF’s shift back to the option of autonomy. In fact, an 
MNLF official ever mentioned that they actually did not want autonomy. Instead, they 
were “pressured thrice by the OIC to talk with the Government.”49 
 
The Accord paved the way to the new phase of mediation process by the OIC Committee 
of Six. The new Committee was actually an expansion from the previous Committee of 
Four, with two additional member countries, i.e. Bangladesh and Indonesia. This time, 
Indonesia was officially appointed the chair of the Committee – for further reference in 
this thesis, those who chair or lead the mediation platform are simply addressed the 
“chief mediator”. 
 
There are some systemic changes in the Philippines in the late 1980s that provided a good 
momentum for the fruitful talks, as elaborated earlier. However, those factors coalesced 
together could have been useless if there were no mediator to bring the parties back on 
the negotiation table. Theoretically, the mediator’s role is important to strategically 
capitalize on the ripeness of the conflict. The return of the MNLF to the negotiation, for 
instance, was not only owing to its weakening power, but also to the pressure put by the 
OIC.50  
 
The Committee of Six mediated the peace talks that eventually led to the conclusion of 
the 1996 FPA. Prior to the signing of the 1996 FPA, there were four rounds of formal 
peace talks held from October 1993 until August 1996 as well as nine informal 
meetings.51 It means that in average, four meetings were organized every year, which 
portrays intensive communication not only between the negotiating parties but also 
between them and the mediator. Such an intensive sequence of meetings helped the peace 
talks to maintain the favorable momentum, because any possible change in the 
circumstances might influence the stance of each negotiating parties. 
 
The Agreement signed on 2 September 1996 initially created the Southern Philippine 
Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) as provisional autonomous government in 
ARMM, which covers 13 provinces agreed under the 1976 Peace Agreement.52 The 
further implementation of the FPA is split into two phases, i.e. phase (1) establishing of 
SPCPD, the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), and the Consultative 
Assembly; and phase (2) organizing plebiscite to determine the establishment of a new 
autonomous government in the Southern Philippines.53 
 
The 1996 Final Peace Agreement is the most fundamental formal documents in the GRP-
MNLF peace process, as it is the reference for the ongoing peace talks, which is more 
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technical in details. For instance, one of the latest important developments in the GRP-
MNLF peace process is the signing of the MoU on Legal Panel in April 2010, also 
brokered by Indonesia.54 It did not only terminate the armed conflict between the GRP 
and MNLF determinatively, but also helped encourage the commencement of the GRP-
MILF peace talks. As said by Blas F. Ople, former Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, 
"The settlement sets precedents that hopefully will inspire the last remaining separatist 
movement in Mindanao, the MILF, to follow in the path of peace."55 
 
The most distinct character between the 1996 and 1976 Peace Agreement is that the 
former has proven its sustainability up until today. The current peace talks focuses on the 
implementation of the Final Agreement, which is very practical in nature. The breakdown 
of the 1976 Peace Agreement demonstrates how the failure to deal with the technical 
implementation of the Agreement would lead to the failure of the whole agreement and 
would hinder the whole peace process. 
 
 
II.3. The Mediator Behavior: the OIC’s standing and Close Coordination 
  
This thesis holds the argument that the conclusion of the 1996 FPA and its success in 
providing the ground for the long-term solution to the GRP-MNLF conflict are owing to 
the mediator behavior, among other reasons. At the beginning, the OIC exerted its 
leverage – also making use of the MNLF’s weakening power – to make the MNLF shift 
back to the option of autonomy. This, in turn, would also make the GRP more willing to 
resume the mediated peace talks. 
 
A downside to the OIC’s standing vis-à-vis the GRP is the fact that only the MNLF has 
been accepted as an observer to the Organization. The GRP’s proposal to become an 
observer country to the OIC has not yet been positively responded, mainly due to the 
strong resistance from some member countries, i.e. Arab Saudi and Libya. Fortunately, 
this evident “partiality” had not brought any significant harm to the peace process.  
 
Also, looking back to the first phase of mediation by the Committee of Four, the OIC 
actually lacked leverage over the GRP, but the power of its members helped boost it up. 
The OIC gained its leverage from the influential member countries, namely Libya and 
Saudi Arabia that had a control over the Philippines oil supply.56 On the other hand, the 
OIC has a relatively bigger leverage vis-à-vis the MNLF, because it was due to the OIC’s 
recognition and support that the MNLF could gain its international leverage and be 
“accepted” as a negotiating party by the GRP. 
 
In fact, the OIC had been increasing its standing over time, through its good office in the 
GRP-MNLF peace process. The continuity of the mediation by the OIC Committee even 
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until today demonstrates its good standing vis-à-vis the negotiating parties.57 More 
concretely, over the three years period of mediation (1993-1996) the OIC Committee of 
Six had been building its standing through intensive formal and informal communications 
with the negotiating parties.  
 
The convening of nine informal meetings prior to the conclusion of 1996 FPA shows that 
informal diplomacy was quite a significant strategy employed by the OIC Committee of 
Six. Indonesia also gave a special meaning to and highly valued the informality of the 
meetings. According to the former Foreign Minister of Indonesia who was also 
representing Indonesia as the chief mediator, Ali Alatas, informal meetings were very 
important to test is negotiation was really desired by both negotiating parties as well as to 
check the level of acceptance of Indonesia as the chief mediator by the parties.58  
 
Having an estimation of its level of acceptance helps a mediator to decide upon the best 
strategy option, whether it is the facilitation, procedural or directive one. Putting it in this 
context, the OIC had clearly used a directive strategy at the earliest stage, to push both 
parties back into the negotiation. A directive strategy was the best option to make the 
MNLF accept the option of autonomy, otherwise, the negotiation could have not been 
started.  
 
Additionally, informal meetings also help increase the leverage, because frequent 
informal contacts would gradually grow the trust of the negotiating parties on the 
mediator. It is said by one of Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry officials that the informal 
meetings organized by Indonesia were somewhat different from those by Libya.59 Unlike 
Libya, Indonesia did not use a directive strategy and took a more friendly approach 
instead. This kind of mediator behavior is beneficial for long-term working relationship. 
 
During the peace talks, the OIC, particularly Indonesia as the chief mediator, had applied 
the procedural strategy. In this case, it encouraged both sides to prepare negotiable 
position and practical proposal, as well as taking initiative in organizing the necessary 
preceding meetings. The application of procedural strategy is apparent in the way 
Indonesia had arranged the meetings. In this case, Indonesia had been able to restructure 
the negotiation into three layers, i.e. (1) formal negotiations at the level of leaders, (2) 
consultations at the level of senior officials, and (3) seminars to disseminate information 
to the public.60 This structure, according to the Indonesian chief mediator at that time, 
Sastrohandoyo, was the most suitable approach in handling such a delicate conflict.61 
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Indonesia’s active mediation role in the roads toward the 1996 Final Peace Agreement is 
clear as it hosted the four rounds of Formal Peace Talks, which each round resulted in the 
signing of a formal document.62 Indonesia also hosted several meetings of the Mixed 
Committee and the Support Committees in preparation for the Final Agreement. As the 
mediator, Indonesia had to keep the pace and sequence of the preparatory meetings and 
the rounds of Formal Talks in order to have enough time in formulating the most 
acceptable proposal for both sides, but at the same time, not to lose the momentum.  
 
Indonesia had been gaining its leverage as the chief mediator from all involving parties. 
Formally, it holds the mandate from the OIC as the Chair of the Committee of Six. As 
elaborated earlier, a mediator standing can derive from the organization with which the 
mediator is affiliated as well as contributes to the effectiveness of the mediation.63  
 
In the eye of the GRP, Indonesia is not only a neighbor country, but also a good fellow 
since both countries are the members as well as the founding fathers of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, having a Government mediator, and not 
a non-state actor instead, makes the mediation process more trustable and reliable for the 
GRP. While for the MNLF, Indonesia might be seen as a bias mediator due to its 
relations with the GRP. However, Indonesia also benefits from its image of a Muslim-
populated country. 
 
Procedural strategy that was applied in the GRP-MNLF peace talks had enabled 
Indonesia to exert a more formal control over the process and environment of the 
mediation; to determine structural aspects of the meetings, […] and the situation powers 
of the parties’ resources and communication processes; but little or no control over other 
aspects. This is similar to the so-called formulation style, in which the “formulator” may 
play a more active role, such as: asking the parties to brainstorm, suggesting that issues 
be either disaggregated or linked together, inventing new solutions and so forth.64  
 
In this manner, Indonesia played a bigger role than a channel of communication among 
disputing parties, but on the other hand, it did not have adequate resources to play carrot-
and-stick. What is also important is that Indonesia had maintained the level of comfort 
between the two parties through a mediation style that is not too forceful on either side 
but accommodating both aspirations as well as is rich with initiatives. By applying this 
strategy, it tries to maintain its leverage by keeping the trust from both parties.  
 
There is an opinion that the GRP-MNLF peace process had actually been severely 
weakened by the end of 1998 for some reasons.65 In spite of that situation, the peace talks 
between the GRP and MNLF has been enduring ever since. Regardless of the challenges, 
both negotiating parties had stayed in the negotiation, unlike in the previous phase when 
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MNLF walked out from the peace talks due to disagreement with the GRP. It proves that 
both parties had seen the OIC Committee of Six had provided the best possible platform 
for them to settle the conflict, they would not look at any other possibilities. 
 
The peace talks between the GRP and MNLF is still ongoing until today, which deal with 
the “leftover” technical issues.. The process has brought up significant progress as both 
sides’ BATNAs have moved closer over time. What is also important is that it helps 
maintain the stable peace in the Southern Philippines.66 The relationship between the 
GRP and MNLF has become less fragile than it used to be, due to the continuous 
meetings and contacts facilitated by the OIC.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
Protracted GRP – MILF Talks: Multiparty Mediation by Malaysia and the ICG 
 
 
MILF’s was officially established in 1984.67 Before, it had been the “MNLF new 
leadership” formed by Salamat Hashim who decided to separate from the MNLF in 
1978.68 While the MNLF is more nationalist in pursuing a separation of Moro from the 
Philippines, MILF is more Islamic-oriented. Thus, MILF required that Muslims of the 
Southern Philippines live a fully Islamic way of life based on the shari’a (Islamic law).69  
 
This chapter elaborates the ongoing peace talks between the GRP and MILF, with 
reference to the mediator standing. The main argument in this thesis is that due to the 
relatively low standing of the mediators, their option of strategy is limited only to 
communication-facilitation, as explained in the chapter one. As a result, Malaysia and the 
International Contact Group (ICG) do not have adequate influence over both negotiating 
parties to push them to conclude a peace agreement in a short time. 
 
For that purpose, this chapter is composed largely by examining the developments of the 
peace talks so far, including documents signed by both sides, as well as statements by 
officials from the negotiating parties and mediator. I consider this process-tracing method 
fit because the case is still developing and much information pertaining to the peace talks 
are shared to public audience by both negotiating parties through mass media and their 
official websites. 
 
 
III.1. The Failure of the GRP-MILF Negotiation 
The formal negotiation between the GRP and MILF began as soon as the former 
concluded the FPA with the MNLF in 1996. As already mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the FPA had truly inspired the GRP to pursue peaceful settlement in the 
Southern Philippines with the other Muslim secessionist group, MILF. Obviously, the 
GRP wished to make the autonomy arrangement in the FPA a model for the future 
settlement with the MILF.70 However, the MILF was not even satisfied with the option of 
autonomy because the original position of the MILF to establish an independent Islamic 
state separate from the Philippines had remained firm. 
 
For some initial years, the negotiation had taken place without any third party’s 
mediation. During this phase, both parties had managed to have exploratory talks and 
formal talks, resulting in the signing of the Agreement for the General Cessation of 
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Hostilities in July 1997 as well as a number of similar agreements and joint statements on 
ceasefire in 1999. Other than this Agreement, there was no substantial development in the 
peace talks, in terms of getting both parties BATNAs closer. The negotiation fell short as 
the former President Joseph Estrada launched an “all-out-war” against the MILF in April 
2000, which turned out to seize most of the MILF’s fixed camps. The MILF responded 
with declaring an ‘indefinite suspension’ of the negotiation with the GRP.71 
  
The absence of mediator at the early phase of the GRP – MILF peace talks was somehow 
peculiar, because in the situation of distrust, the standing of a mediator is needed to help 
both sides start the communication and proceed further with negotiation. MILF, whose 
struggle is said to be more radical and stance more rigid than the MNLF, did not 
completely call off the negotiation option. Negotiation might have been used as a “buying 
time” tactic while the MILF forces organize themselves and prepare for the next battles. 
This is also supported by the fact that the MILF had strengthened its weaponry and the 
presence of its troops, with estimated strength of up to 12,000 forces concentrated in 
Central Mindanao.72  
….. 
Likewise, it might also be used by the GRP to explore more information about the 
posture of the MILF forces on the ground. It was necessary for the GRP because in this 
period, the MILF’s guerilla struggle had become more mobile and hidden than before.73 
In the speech he made later on in 2008, the former President Joseph Estrada underlined 
that the MILF never kept its word and ‘only use[d] ceasefires to regroup and strengthen 
their forces’.74 As things turned out shortly, both parties failed to sustain the peace talks 
and restrain themselves from escalating the hostilities.  
 
Even so, I would argue that the wish for peace was, to certain extent, also a motivation 
for both sides in doing the negotiation. Theoretically, the decision to go into a negotiation 
will not be taken at the first place if the parties do not see any potential to reach an 
agreement at all or, more specifically, to make their BATNAs closer.Thus, in this case, 
both the GRP and MILF might also wish for a potential point (or points) of agreement out 
of the peace talks. In the period of the negotiation, the MILF Spokesperson, Eid Kabalu 
stated that the MILF “...do not discount the possibility of a reconciliation…” with the 
GRP, although the option of autonomy was not acceptable either.75 
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After a series of talks in the long run, the behavior of the negotiating parties may undergo 
some changes, and one party may adapt to the position of the other. In view of that, the 
role of a mediator could be very important in influencing the parties to modify their 
positions. In my opinion, the “all-out-war” could have not occurred if a mediator with an 
adequate standing had been present in the peace talks. In that case, the mediator could 
have been able to exert its influence over each party to convince them to remain in the 
negotiation. In the absence of a mediator, especially the one with a high standing, the 
distrust between negotiating parties is more difficult to manage. Therefore, hostilities 
may erupt quickly and make the distrust between parties even higher than ever. 
 
 
III.2. The State of Art 
III.2.1. The Beginning of Malaysia’s Involvement as the Third-Party 
Malaysia began to mediate the peace talks between GRP and MILF in 2001.76 It was the 
first time in the GRP – MILF peace talks that a third-party was present to mediate. The 
former President of the Philippines Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo initiated to invite 
Malaysian government at the first place, which was also agreed by the MILF. Since then, 
the GRP – MILF talks entered into ‘substantive discussions’.77  
 
As of May 2012, the GRP and MILF have met in 28 formal exploratory talks. The latest 
one was held on 28-30 May 2012 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Previously, at the 27th 
exploratory talks, both parties agreed upon the Ten Decision Points on Principles as of 
April 2012, which inter alia underlines the parties’ agreement on creating a new 
‘autonomous entity’ replacing the currently existing ARMM with a ministerial form of 
government, as well as on power- and wealth-sharing between the National Government 
(GRP) and the new autonomous entity.78 
 
Until today, the 1996 FPA is considered by the MILF inadequate to solve the Southern 
Philippine issue because of “its failure to reify roots in Islamic ‘treaty devise’ and 
constitutionally to evolve an autonomous polity on that foundation…”79 From this 
statement by the MILF, however, it is clear that they are no longer pursuing a full 
independence from the Philippines. The emphasis of the MILF’s position now is on 
evolving an autonomous polity, which is apparently quite distinct from the ARMM.  
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The MILF’s refusal to the existing form of autonomy granted to ARMM is primarily 
based on three reasons, namely (1) the MILF demands more autonomous power, for 
instance, in legal system, (2) the current ARMM does not cover the whole area they 
consider as their “ancestral domain”80 and (3) the past plebiscite to determine whether or 
not a province would join the ARMM was not exclusive for the Bangsamoro people only, 
giving an explanation for the low number of Southern Philippines provinces joining the 
ARMM in the end. 
 
At the moment, the MILF’s position as indicated in public is to create an association, 
which is highly autonomous but not fully independent from the Philippines.81 For that 
purpose, the MILF wishes that the ongoing talks with the GRP would produce a 
“comprehensive compact”, which basically was highlighted in the annulled 
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD).82  
 
To some people, the MILF version of comprehensive compact means creating a sub-state, 
which is also against the Philippine Constitution. In fact, the MILF Chairman Murad 
Ebrahim says in a press conference that his Front is now demanding a sub-state with its 
own court system.83 On the contrary, the GRP strictly holds onto literal interpretation; it 
will not be a sub-state if the word is not mentioned in any record or agreement.  
 
Clearly, there is still a gap between both sides’ interpretations on the expected outcome 
of their negotiation. Even after reaching the ten consensus points in the end of April 
2012, the MILF still considers that both parties remain far from concluding a peace 
agreement.84 This thesis is of the view that both parties are aware of this discrepancy, 
thus, they have not yet defined a precise term for the ‘new autonomous entity’ to be 
created. This is a common situation in negotiations where the parties, and also possibly 
the mediator, maintain ambiguity in order to keep the negotiation go on. An exposed 
divergence, in contrast, could risk the parties’ withdrawal from the negotiation. 
 
Also, the MILF Chairman’s press statement regarding a sub-state gives an indication of 
miscommunication amongst the MILF officials, i.e. between the Chairman and the 
negotiating team. Even though ambiguity may sometimes be useful, such a situation 
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should not persist too long. The longer the ambiguity is maintained, the lengthier the 
negotiation will be. To avoid such an event, A mediator should help make it clear 
between both parties. In this case, Malaysia should ask both parties to clarify their 
understanding on the results achieved so far as well as on the projected outcomes of the 
overall peace talks. 
 
To sum up, even though both parties have not yet come close to a similar position, their 
BATNAs have somewhat been closer than they were at the beginning of the mediation 
process more than a decade ago. Over the years, the mediation has helped transform the 
parties’ position. The transformation of MILF’s position is substantial, as it has dropped 
its original demand for independence. In return, the GRP gave in a number of minor 
things to accommodate MILF’s request, such as the establishment of Bangsamoro 
Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI)85 for capacity building and the addition of 
new mediator team, i.e. the ICG, making the GRP – MILF peace talks a multiparty 
mediation ever since. 
 
III.2.2. The Failure of MOA-AD and the Formation of the ICG 
The drafting of the MOA-AD in 2008 seemed to be the path toward a peace agreement 
between the GRP and MILF. However, the initialed draft was failed to be signed due to 
the Philippine Supreme Court’s decision that the MOA-AD was against the Philippine 
Constitution in August that year.86 The failure to sign the MOA-AD led to the break out 
of armed conflict between the two parties. Only in February 2009, both parties resumed 
the talks with the facilitation of Malaysia. 
 
Following the breakdown of the MOA-AD, the MILF stated the need for an 
“international guarantee from states or association of nations” (meaning, multiparty 
mediation) as one of the conditions for the resumption of the talks with the GRP.87 As 
will be explained in the following section of this chapter, the motivation of the MILF to 
initiate the idea of adding more mediators is not only to overcome the trauma of the failed 
MOA-AD – as claimed in the media, but also, and more concretely, to rise the leverage 
of the mediator over the GRP. 
 
The ICG officially became the mediator in the peace talks between GRP and MILF in 
September 2009, after the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Formation of the 
International Contact Group. The ICG consists of four member states, i.e. Japan, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, and United Kingdom, as well as four NGOs, i.e. Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue, The Asia Foundation, Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiyah 
(Indonesian religious group). 
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The mandate of the ICG, as published on the official website of the OPAPP is primarily 
to exert the “necessary” leverage and assistance towards sustaining the trust and 
confidence of both sides in the negotiation.88 The wording of this mandate has the 
emphasis on the words “necessary” as well as on the straightforward and specific role it 
has to play, namely to help sustain the trust and confidence. Such a formulation indicates 
the low standing of the ICG and, therefore, the limited room for strategy maneuver. The 
mandate strictly fits the communication-facilitation strategy of mediation, which mainly 
deals with helping negotiating parties maintain their communications. 
 
As an ad-hoc mediator, the ICG may attend and observe the negotiations, visit and advise 
the negotiating parties (potentially with the assistance of recognized experts), and meet 
with the negotiating parties upon request to resolve outstanding issues.89 ICG is projected 
to complement and support the work of Malaysia as the chief mediator. The consultation 
of the ICG is coordinated through the Malaysian ‘facilitator’.90 
 
 
III.3. Analysis of the Mediator’s Standing 
In the real context, Malaysia is called a ‘facilitator’, which actually insinuates its standing 
in the GRP – MILF peace talks. The ‘facilitator’ status makes it even clearer that 
Malaysia is tasked only to ‘facilitate’ the talks and, therefore, has a limited mandate and 
power over the negotiating parties. Despite that, for the sake of consistency, this thesis 
will maintain the usage of the terms ‘mediator’ and ‘chief-mediator’. 
 
A scholar argues that the distrust between the GRP and MILF has remained high due to 
the deep social, cultural and religious differences between the peoples they represent, i.e. 
the Christian Filipino and Bangsamoro people.91 In this regard, the decision to invite 
Malaysia as a mediator is apt, at least, for two reasons. The first is that Malaysia, as a 
Muslim-populated country with an evident Islamic culture, would likely gain confidence 
from the MILF. Having the similar religious and cultural background, Malaysia can 
establish rapport with the MILF more easily, for instance compared to a Christian-
dominated country. The second reason is that Malaysia, hosting many non-Muslim 
citizens, depicts an example that Islam can coexist peacefully with other religions. 
 
Besides those incentives, the Malaysian state of Sabah has deep-rooted historical ties 
with Sulu of the Philippines. Sabah was once a part of the Sultanate of Sulu back in the 
18th century, after the Sultan of Brunei ceded the North Borneo to Sulu.92 The centuries-
old ties between Sabah and Sulu are evident through the fact that the inhabitants of both 
areas share the similar racial stock, customs and traditions.93 This close connection 
explains why Sabah had been the main destination of the Mindanao exiles, besides the 
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reason of geographical proximity. Only during the period of 1971-1976 when the conflict 
in the Southern Philippines firstly erupted, approximately 300,000 refugees went to 
Sabah region in Malaysia.94 
 
Such a massive flow of people had largely drawn the attention of the Malaysian 
government. Considering that the continued Southern Philippines conflict could impact 
on its domestic stability, Malaysia certainly has an interest in terminating the armed 
conflict in a peaceful manner. 
 
Meanwhile, for the GRP, Malaysia is a long-standing regional partner. Furthermore, the 
aforementioned Malaysia’s potential leverage over the MILF is actually advantageous for 
the GRP, since having a mediator that is somewhat trustable to the MILF helps maintain 
the MILF’s commitment to stay in the negotiation. Nonetheless, the Philippines – 
Malaysia relations got irritated by the Philippines’ claim over Sabah area, which was 
officially filed in June 1962.95 The claim was eventually dropped by the Philippines in 
1976,96 and since then, it is no longer a government-to-government dispute.  
 
However, just recently, the debate over the rightful descendant of the Sultanate of Sulu 
came up again in Sabah. Finally, in February 2011, a local Sabahan was designated the 
Sultan of Sulu, witnessed by representatives from the Southern Philippine Tausug 
communities of Tawi-Tawi, Palawan and Sulu.97 This event is said by a scholar to be a 
symbol of relinquishment of Sulu’s claim over Sabah, of which the rationale is that since 
the 1970s Malaysian government has been quite receptive to Sulu refugees.98  
 
In line with this argument, I also think that this is a gesture of friendship and closeness 
between the peoples of Sabah and Sulu. It is, yet, unclear whether or not the event helps 
increase Malaysia’s standing as a mediator between the GRP and MILF, since the 
connection of those aforementioned Bangsamoro people with the MILF is unidentified. 
However, since Tausug community in general is more associated with the MNLF, I 
presume that the event does not favor Malaysia’s standing vis-à-vis MILF. Instead, it 
could negatively affect Malaysia’s standing vis-à-vis the GRP if the event was not 
clarified by the Malaysian government. 
 
Malaysia’s standing is also limited by its lack of resources to provide the negotiating 
parties with ‘carrot’ (i.e. material advantages). The best potential for increasing 
Malaysia’s standing is its leadership in the International Monitoring Team (IMT), a joint 
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military and civil grouping to monitor the implementation of practical aspects of the GRP 
– MILF peace talks on the ground.99 Malaysia also supplies the largest contingent of 
troops.100 However, the role of Malaysia in other issues, for instance, in the development 
or reconstruction of Mindanao remains minor. 
 
Thus, the creation of the ICG could fill the loopholes. Although ICG is an ad-hoc element 
of the mediation, it has more potential of leverage over the negotiating parties, due the 
capacity of its members. Japan, the largest donor to the Philippines, has been providing 
ODA to Mindanao since early 1989.101 As desired by the MILF, having more mediators 
joined the GRP – MILF peace talks would increase the mediator’s leverage over the 
GRP. 
 
Besides Japan, the other ICG members have their own potential of leverage; i.e. Saudi 
Arabia is also a member of the OIC, which is wanted by the MILF; United Kingdom is a 
member of the European Union and has the experience of managing four countries with 
different legal system within its territory; while Turkey is a picture of moderate Muslim 
country. All in all, the member states have their own share to contribute. 
 
The involvement of civil society organizations in the ICG can help improve the delicate 
GRP – MILF relations. Over time, the hostilities between both parties had broken out 
repeatedly. To mention the highlight of the armed conflict occurred during the peace talks 
period, there was the “all-out-war” following the breakdown of the first negotiation phase 
in 2000, “Buliok offensive” in 2003 to capture the former MILF Chairman Salamat 
Hashim,102 the one following the cancelled signing of the MOA-AD in 2008, as well as 
the most recent armed attacks in October 2011.103 
 
On one hand, the ICG can help increase the mediator standing in general, but on the other 
hand, it does not make a substantial change because the mandate given by the parties to 
the ICG is clear, i.e. only limited to the communication-facilitation strategy of mediation. 
In addition, the ICG’s leverage is unlikely to help boost Malaysia’s standing as the chief 
mediator. In fact, there is a tendency that Malaysia feels uneasy to its position vis-à-vis 
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other mediators. As suggested by a study, Malaysia “has been very jealous about 
external involvement in the peace process.”104 
  
Such a situation could risk the coordination amongst mediators. Malaysia holds the chief 
mediator status, but its de facto leverage over other mediators is relatively low. Malaysia 
does not have adequate control over the ICG because the ICG is not in a subordinate 
position. Also, Malaysia cannot directly obtain the leverage from the ICG because it is 
not even a member.  
 
Malaysia’s standing, in this case, is vulnerable to the increasing leverage of the individual 
member of the ICG. The “individuality” of the ICG is evident, for instance, through the 
fact that when giving contribution or developmental aid, Japan acts on its own behalf and 
not of the ICG. It is clearly one of the shortcomings of an ad-hoc group, that is the 
members tend to act on their own behalf due to the weak mandate and responsibility. 
 
Malaysia’s standing was rather at stake when its chief mediator, Dato’ Othman Abdul 
Razak, was strongly resisted by the GRP. The GRP requested for a new chief mediator 
that is ‘acceptable for both sides’, however the MILF wanted otherwise.105 MILF refused 
to continue the talks with the GRP without the presence of Malaysia’s mediator.106 Some 
sources also mentioned that previously during Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s administration, 
the GRP had already tried twice to have Dato’ Othman replaced, but never been approved 
by the Malaysian government.107 
 
The Malaysian government’s refusal to replace its chief mediator after a number of 
requests may indicate two things. The first is that Malaysia wanted to defend its standing, 
both as a mediator and a sovereign government, that it has the authority to appoint its 
representative in the GRP – MILF peace talks. The second, which might also be 
perceived by the GRP, is that Malaysia had only been following the MILF’s demand to 
keep Dato’ Othman. Both cases 
 
In October 2010, the Philippine President Benigno Aquino III requested the Malaysian 
Prime Minister Najib Razak to assign a new chief mediator. In November 2010, an 
official request was sent by the Philippine to Malaysian government, as the GRP 
negotiating panel had “difficulties” working with Dato’ Othman Abdul Razak.108 
Afterward, the GRP chief negotiator Dean Marvic Leonen made an official statement, as 
quoted from the Philippine government official gazette, that: 
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“…any good facilitator knows that if one side has lack of confidence in him, he should 
immediately resign for the sake of the negotiations. […]We are also surprised that he claims 
credit for the outcome of past negotiations. We thought that these are talks between the GRP 
and the MILF. Has he been dictating the terms of the agreements? […] There is too much 
mistrust and recrimination.”109 
 
Dato’ Othman Abdul Razak finally resigned from his position in April 2011, and was 
replaced by Tengku Abdul Ghaffar Tengku Mohamad. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Lessons Learned from the Mediation Platforms in the Southern Philippines Conflict 
 
 
The previous chapters have examined the mediation by the OIC Ministerial Committee of 
Six in the GRP – MNLF talks as well as by Malaysia and International Contact Group 
(ICG) in the GRP – MILF talks. This chapter is intended to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of each platform, and eventually obtain lessons for an effective multiparty 
mediation in the Southern Philippine conflict and, if applicable, to other similar conflicts. 
 
From the previous chapters, we have identified the distinction of result between the GRP 
– MNLF talks and GRP – MILF talks, that is the former had come with a peace 
agreement within a relatively short period, i.e. approximately three years. Furthermore, 
during the mediation period, the hostilities between the two parties had been restrained. 
The GRP and MNLF have never gone into an armed dispute ever since. In contrast, the 
GRP – MILF talks have not produced a final peace agreement as yet. From time to time, 
hostilities between the two parties broke out even though they had signed a ceasefire 
agreement in 2003. 
 
This chapter is much of a reflection from the chapter II and III. It firstly elaborates the 
similar traits shared by the two chief mediators, i.e. Indonesia and Malaysia, in order to 
comprehend the basic modalities for an acceptable mediator in the Southern Philippines 
conflict. After that, the differences of mediator characteristics in general, also involving 
the OIC Committee of Six and the ICG, will also be analyzed to give a contrasting 
picture between the two platforms. 
   
IV.1. Indonesia and Malaysia Head-to-Head: Similarities and Differences 
Indonesia and Malaysia share some similar traits. As both states are the chief mediator in 
the Southern Philippines conflict, the similarities between them could suggest the 
rationale behind the preference for an acceptable mediator in the conflict and, to certain 
extent, in other conflicts originated from a minority Muslim insurgents fighting for 
independence. 
 
The first aspect is the geopolitical context. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are trusted 
regional partners to the Philippines. They are all members of ASEAN, meaning that they 
have maintained a high level of confidence amongst them, due to the long-established 
regional grouping. The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 helped the countries improve 
their bilateral relations as well, since the relationships between post-independence 
Southeast Asian countries had been troubled by some security issues. 
 
The Philippines, for instance, had been anxious about Indonesia’s expansionist policy in 
the 1960s.110 While with Malaysia, the Philippines had had a territorial dispute regarding 
Sabah area. The situations changed following the establishment of ASEAN as well as the 
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regime change in Indonesia and the Philippines and, ever since, the relations between 
those countries had become more cooperative than before. To some extent, ASEAN had 
been able to grow the feeling of regionalism and the awareness of the need for regional 
stability. 
 
Such a ‘regional awareness’ might have influenced the position of Indonesia and 
Malaysia regarding the issue of Southern Philippines. A scholar mentioned that in the 
OIC, Indonesia and Malaysia had always tried to balance and ease Libya’s strong 
position against the Philippines.111 Both states had always defended the non-interference 
principle and the need for respecting the Philippines’ national sovereignty.112 This thesis 
argues that it was not only the solidarity that motivated both states to be more in favour 
of the Philippine, but also the fear of regional instability possibly generated by the 
Philippine’s reaction. The assumption was if the Philippines had been put in the corner all 
the time by the international community, it would have become more resistant and 
continued fighting the MNLF. 
 
The next aspect is the cultural-religious background. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are 
Muslim-dominated countries but also maintain religious diversity at the same time. This 
sends a strong signal, not only to the MNLF and MILF but also to the international 
community, that the differences of religion, ethnicity and culture not necessarily require 
separation. By having Indonesia and Malaysia as chief mediator, it would help educate 
the secessionist groups gradually that Islam can coexist peacefully with other religions, 
thus, separation from the Christian-dominated Philippines would not be necessary. 
 
Such a religious closeness between the mediator and a negotiating party can help 
establish rapport between them more easily. Especially, Islam tradition acknowledges the 
sense of solidarity amongst Muslims. To some extent, it gives a way for Indonesia and 
Malaysia to build, respectively, the MNLF’s and MILF’s trust at the initial stage of 
communication. Even though, there is also another favourable factor for Malaysia, i.e. the 
historical link between Sabah and Sulu, as discussed in the previous chapter.113 
 
The Islamic values and tradition are more manifested in Malaysia, along with its 
recognition of Islam as the federal religion. While Indonesia, officially recognizing other 
religions as well, maintains a more secular image in the international community. Along 
these lines, it is most appropriate to have Malaysia mediating the MILF platform because 
its struggle had been strongly inspired by the establishment of an Islamic state for 
Bangsamoro people.114 It could have been more difficult to build rapport, for instance, 
between the MILF and Indonesia, due to the distant interpretation of Islam in the political 
context. On the other hand, the issue does not equally matter to the MNLF, because of its 
more secular character. 
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IV.2. The Organization of Mediators 
The most distinct difference between the OIC Committee of Six and the ICG is that the 
former was created by an already established international organization, i.e. the OIC, 
while the ICG is an ad-hoc issue-specific grouping to support the GRP – MILF mediation 
process. This difference will be discussed in this section, in view of the nature of the 
organization has a significant influence on the mediator standing. The OIC as a well-
established international organization is considered to have more legitimacy and standing 
than the ICG as an ad-hoc grouping. This notion has two implications.  
 
The first one is that the existence of the OIC does not depend on the mandate from the 
negotiating parties. Instead, the GRP’s and MNLF’s dependence on the OIC and its 
individual members had increased its standing vis-à-vis both negotiating parties. In 
contrast, the ICG was established upon the request of MILF and with the consent of the 
GRP. The ICG was also given the mandate by both parties, meaning that its existence 
depends on the parties’ decision.  
 
The level of dependence of the MNLF on the OIC is higher than that of the MILF on 
Malaysia and the ICG. The first reason is because back in the past, the MNLF got its first 
international recognition from the OIC. The admission of the MNLF as an observer to the 
Organization helped increased its status from a sort of “rebel group” to be a negotiating 
party vis-à-vis the GRP. As later confirmed by Nur Misuari, when interviewed by 
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., he actually had been disappointed with the implementation of the 
FPA, but the MNLF “cannot afford to be isolated from the Islamic world”.115 
 
The parties’ high dependence had allowed the OIC to reframe the outcome of the GRP – 
MNLF talks since the very beginning. As discussed earlier, the option of autonomy was 
clearly preferable to the OIC, because it recognized the MNLF’s struggle for self-
determination and, at the same time, the Philippine national sovereignty. A scholar said 
that the recommendation that autonomy be granted to Mindanao was already included as 
an addendum to the report of the Committee of Four in 1973.116 The recommendation had 
become more suggestive following the issuance of the OIC Joint Communiqué and even 
more directive during the mediation by the Committee of Four. 
 
The second implication of the distinct nature of organization is regarding the coordination 
amongst the members of the mediation platform. The Committee of Six was created and 
given the mandate by the OIC. Thus, its assignment had also been recognized 
legitimately by all other members of the Committee and the Organization at large, 
because in international organizations, members are bound by certain rules and norms. 
This legitimate recognition as the chief mediator had enabled Indonesia to coordinate 
with other Committee member even closer. On the contrary, Malaysia is not even a 
member of the ICG, making coordination amongst individual mediators more 
challenging. In this case, if the chief mediator is a separate entity from the mediator 
grouping, it will create psychological distance and barrier between them to coordinate 
closely. 
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Another distinct character between the MNLF and MILF mediation platform is regarding 
the membership composition. The OIC Committee of Six only consists of member states 
of the OIC, while the ICG is composed by states and NGOs. The presence of NGOs in 
the ICG can be advantageous because those organizations may comfort the MILF more, 
since NGOs are presumably more supportive to a greater autonomy than state actors are. 
Recently, the MILF requested for the first time a meeting only with the NGO element of 
the ICG to discuss the current status of the peace talks.117 
 
In addition, the NGOs with Islamic background like Muhammadiyah (Indonesia) are 
expected to share the experience that Muslim community can co-exist peacefully with 
other religions within a country. This sort of understanding needs to develop to help 
shape the MILF’s view in long term, so that in the future such a ‘new autonomous entity’ 
emerges, the MILF would be able to live side by side with Christian Filipinos peacefully. 
 
However, to the GRP, the presence of foreign NGOs can be more problematic because of 
two reasons. In general, the relationship between governments and NGOs is often 
conflicting in nature, even though cooperation potentials are also present, because NGOs 
are commonly known as supporting self-determination. Another reason is the 
unfamiliarity with the foreign NGOs’ track record. However, this potential problem has 
been minimized because the ICG has only invited well-known NGOs with high 
reputation so far, which is something that needs to sustain.
 
 
 
IV.3. The Standing of the Chief Mediators 
IV.3.1. The Standing vis-à-vis Negotiating Parties  
The previous discussion in this thesis suggests that the position of a chief mediator is 
very significant. It is, however, more evident in the case of GRP – MNLF mediation 
platform. It is already understood that as the chief mediator in the GRP – MNLF peace 
talks, Indonesia had been quite active in playing its role, for instance, by initiating and 
hosting a number of meetings, both formal and informal. Indonesia had also formulated 
the approach that was considered to be most favourable, i.e. restructuring the negotiation 
into three layers.  
 
This thesis believes that as the chief mediator, Indonesia had a good standing vis-à-vis 
the GRP and MNLF. Such a standing was certainly composed of some factors, namely 
the high leverage it had obtained from the OIC as well as the negotiating parties’ trust 
and comfort. It has been clear that the mandate for Indonesia to be the chair the 
Committee of Six had come with certain leverage as well. While at the same time, 
Indonesia had also gained the trust from the negotiating parties due to its traits as a 
trusted regional partner to the GRP as well as a Muslim-populated country that also 
comforted the MNLF. Over time, Indonesia had also managed to develop the level of 
trust and comfort of both negotiating parties through close contacts and intensive 
meetings. 
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Benefiting from its good standing, Indonesia had enjoyed a certain level of flexibility in 
selecting the best mediation strategy option. Most of the times, Indonesia would apply the 
procedural strategy, which is seen through its ability to influence how the negotiation 
should proceed. Indonesia had had the free-will to apply a mediation strategy that it 
considered most useful, i.e. structuring the negotiation into three layers.118 It is also 
important for a mediator to be able to apply the strategy it feels comfort doing. 
 
The usage of procedural strategy had also allowed it to initiate and host important 
meetings, including the final meeting before the signing of the FPA. Normally, such a 
meeting has a high importance because it is where the parties actually finalize and 
conclude an agreement. It explains why the 1996 FPA is also known as the “Jakarta 
Accord”.119 In addition, being the host of meetings, Indonesia had more privilege for 
influencing the agenda-setting and the proceeding of the meetings. 
 
Besides, Indonesia seemed to have applied the communication-facilitation strategy every 
now and then. The usage of such a strategy is apparent in the way it had maintained 
intensive communication and consultation with both parties through both formal and 
informal meetings. This way, Indonesia had collected as much information as necessary 
to identify common grounds between both parties’ positions. This is also a way to 
facilitate both sides to exchange their views and keep the communication between them 
going on. 
 
The high leverage of the OIC over the GRP and MNLF had so much favoured Indonesia 
in carrying out its duty. Indonesia had been able to exert more influence in the agenda-
setting as well as in the proceeding of the meetings, as it behaved more than just a 
facilitator. In contrast, Malaysia and the ICG have a stricter mandate that only allows 
them to use the communication-facilitation strategy. 
 
In comparison with Indonesia in the MNLF mediation platform, Malaysia has a relatively 
lower standing in the MILF mediation platform. This is because Malaysia, invited by 
both negotiating parties, stands on its own as a chief mediator. In carrying out its 
mediation duty, Malaysia is not affiliated to any international organization with high 
leverage, thus its standing only depends on its own leverage and, of course, the trust of 
the negotiating parties. 
 
Theoretically, the creation of the ICG is supposed to increase the mediator standing vis-à-
vis negotiating parties, as the invited members have various capacity and resources to 
offer to both parties and to contribute to the peace process. However, the strict and 
limited mandate given to the ICG restricts the grouping to exert more influence, for 
instance, on how the negotiation proceeds. Malaysia is unlikely to obtain leverage from 
the ICG for the reasons have been discussed earlier, namely because Malaysia is not a 
part of ICG and ICG itself only has limited leverage.  
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Unlike what happened with the OIC, the leverage of the individual members of the ICG 
has not yet integrated and been transferred to the grouping. Each member of the ICG 
seems to act on their own behalf, instead of collectively on behalf of the grouping. Such 
behaviour, this thesis argues, is largely driven by the different motivation between the 
ICG members. For instance, according to a scholar, Japan’s involvement in the ICG is 
driven by the motivation to support its claims that peace-building is now an important 
pillar in its foreign policy.120 
 
Malaysia lack of resources to offer to both parties, thus, its standing should be more 
developed through building the parties’ trust and dependence over time. However, 
Malaysia almost failed to maintain the trust. The GRP’s strong objection on keeping the 
former Malaysian chief mediator, Dato’ Othman clearly shows the lack of trust on him.121 
At that certain point, Malaysia had risked its standing by refusing to replace Dato’ 
Othman with someone else. It had been more than a year until the replacement took 
place.122 
 
A quite opposite situation happened in the MNLF mediation platform. In this case, 
Indonesia had been able to maintain the continuity in the mediator team. The continuity 
of involvement and familiarity with the issues were also highly important in Indonesia’s 
experience of mediating the GRP and MNLF.123 In general, this event suggests that it is 
essential to maintain impartiality and close contact with the negotiating parties over time, 
in order to grow their trust on the mediator. 
 
IV.3.2. Coordination in the Mediation Platforms 
In multiparty mediation, a chief mediator also needs to make sure of the coordination 
amongst the members of the mediation platform. Coordination is crucial in multiparty 
mediation, because too many uncoordinated ideas and actions may endanger the 
mediation process itself. A chief mediator should assure that each and every member of 
the mediating platform behaves along the lines of the mandate.  
 
For that reason, a chief mediator has to be trusted not only by the negotiating parties, but 
also by other members of the mediation platform. Thus, a leadership capacity is crucial. 
Without it, a chief mediator would lose the trust from other members. In this case, 
Indonesia’s leadership is evident in its ability to decide upon the mediation strategy as 
well as in the fact that many meetings were hosted in Indonesia.  
 
The Committee members’ recognition to Indonesia’s leadership may have come from the 
consideration over its modalities as elaborated in the previous section. Besides, Indonesia 
had also benefited from the fact that its chairmanship of the Committee of Six had been 
legitimately recognized by all members, even at that certain point, it was not the most 
influential member state in the OIC. In general, it is more advantageous to the chief 
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mediator to be affiliated with, and certainly to get the mandate from, an international 
organization since all the decisions are subject to all members’ compliance. 
 
A more challenging situation is, obviously, faced by Malaysia. It has a rather awkward 
position, because as the chief mediator, it is not affiliated with the mediator grouping 
ICG. The ICG is composed by some states that have a relatively higher leverage than 
Malaysia, as well as by international NGOs that may not share the same perspective and 
interests with each other. In that case, it is difficult to identify the common identity or 
common ground that shapes the behaviour of the ICG. For comparison, the common 
ground of the OIC is to promote the interests of Muslim people worldwide.124 
 
When states engage in joint mediation, Iji and Fuchinoe argue, their roles as mediators 
are affected by their own interests.125 That is the case with the ICG, as each member may 
pursue their individual interests, without any common ground that shape the grouping’s 
common interests. In short, despite the ICG was intended to complement and support 
Malaysia, the practice on the ground is not always as easy as expected, since Malaysia’s 
position is not superior vis-à-vis ICG.  
 
Given such a situation, the increasing leverage of the ICG member will not help increase 
Malaysia’s standing as the chief mediator. Instead, the event could possibly risk 
Malaysia’s standing vis-à-vis negotiating parties as well as the other mediators, which 
would not be favourable to the overall continuation of the peace process. Thus, it is 
important for Malaysia and the ICG to start setting a code of conduct or terms of 
reference regarding the coordination mechanism amongst them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
124
 Introduction to the OIC, http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52, 17 June 2012, 10.30 p.m.  
125
 See, Chapter I 
 39 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The role of mediator in the peaceful settlement of the Southern Philippines conflict has 
been essential, given the high distrust and hostility between the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the two secessionist groups, Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Generally, in a 
situation when conflicting parties cannot communicate to each other, due to the distrust 
and hostility, a third-party may help them to communicate and gradually build their trust. 
It is significant in the initial stage of peace talks, since the talks cannot start in the total 
absence of communication.  
 
This role was taken by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) at the initial stage 
of the GRP – MNLF negotiation in the 1970s. The organization had pressured both the 
GRP and MNLF to start the peace talks between them. The recognition from the OIC had 
transformed the status of the MNLF from a ‘rebel group’ to a self-determination 
movement that has higher standing and is more acknowledged by the international 
community. Without such recognition, the GRP would not have accepted the MNLF as a 
negotiating party. 
 
One important thing to highlight in this period of the OIC’s involvement is the high 
standing it had vis-à-vis the GRP and, to a higher extent, MNLF. The high standing is not 
only evident through the OIC’s ability to push both parties to negotiate, but also through 
how it had managed to frame the expected outcome of the negotiation. Along with its 
recognition to the MNLF’s struggle for self-determination, the OIC had also emphasized 
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. This way, the OIC had 
reframed that the most feasible option for both sides was autonomy in Mindanao. 
 
Such a high standing had been acquired by the OIC from its member states. Libya was, at 
that moment, very influential to the MNLF. Saudi Arabia and other oil-exporting 
members, on the other hand, had threatened the Philippine government with oil embargo 
if the latter failed to start the peace talks. Such a high leverage or power had enabled the 
OIC to apply directive strategy toward both parties. Also with the dominance of Libya in 
the Committee of Four, created to mediate the GRP – MNLF, the peace talks had quickly 
concluded the Tripoli Agreement in 1976. 
 
Nonetheless, the failure to implement 1976 Agreement showed that directive strategy and 
Libya’s partiality toward the MNLF did not work, in the sense that it had not created a 
long-lasting peace. Having learned the situation, the OIC expanded the existing 
Committee to be the Committee of the Six, this time with Indonesia as the chief mediator. 
The new Committee had managed to help the GRP and MNLF conclude the Final Peace 
Agreement in 1996, which had created the long-lasting peace between the two parties 
until today. 
 
The key of success of the GRP – MNLF mediation platform throughout 1993-1996, as 
proposed in this thesis, was the ability of the Committee of the Six to apply the most 
 40 
appropriate mediation strategy at that time, i.e. the procedural strategy. The procedural 
strategy, which is more influential than the communication-facilitation but not as 
aggressive as the directive one, was proven to be effective to conclude a long-lasting 
peace agreement in a relatively short time. Indonesia, as the chief mediator, had been able 
to restructure the negotiation into three layers, involving formal and informal meetings, 
which was considered most suitable by the Indonesian officials. In this manner, Indonesia 
was able to determine how the negotiation proceeded but at the same time, unlike the way 
Libya had done before, maintain the intensive communication with both parties in a 
tactful and friendly manner.  
 
It was possible for the OIC Committee and, particularly, Indonesia to have such 
flexibility in strategy option, because the OIC standing was high enough. The MNLF was 
highly dependent on the support from the OIC and its particular member states and, in 
general, the OIC was seen by both the GRP and MNLF as their only possible avenue for 
moving on with the peace process. 
 
Besides driving the initiation of the peace talks, another potential role of a mediator is 
maintaining the negotiating parties’ commitment, trust and comfort level to stay in the 
negotiation, even after some series of failure. This is important at the next stage, when 
peace talks have already begun. This role is mostly played by Malaysia in the GRP – 
MILF peace talks. Despite the outbreak of hostilities for several times, the mediation 
process between the two parties goes on even until today, which is unlikely to happen 
without the presence of a mediator. 
 
From 2001 until today, the GRP – MILF mediation process has not yet been able to 
conclude a final peace agreement. Also, it had not been quite effective in restraining the 
hostility between the GRP and MILF, as demonstrated by a series of armed fighting 
throughout the peace process. This thesis believes that it is because the inability of the 
mediator, i.e. Malaysia and the ICG, to exert an adequate influence over the negotiating 
parties. 
 
Malaysia, as the chief mediator, only has limited influence over the negotiation procedure 
because the only possible strategy for it to apply is the communication-facilitation 
strategy. The same thing applies to the ICG, which is only given the limited mandate to 
complement and support the work of Malaysia, particularly, in sustaining the trust and 
confidence between the GRP and MILF. Such a restriction exists because Malaysia was 
invited and, therefore, given the mandate by both parties to ‘facilitate’ the peace talks. In 
this case, the level of dependence of the parties on Malaysia is not high enough, 
compared to that of the GRP and MNLF on the OIC.  
 
One lesson learned from the OIC mediation is that the leverage of the most influential 
OIC members, i.e. Libya and Saudi Arabia, had helped increase the leverage of the OIC 
and, consequentially, the Committees it created to carry out the mediation duty. Looking 
at the mediation by the Committee of Six, Indonesia was able to obtain such a leverage to 
increase its standing as the chief mediator, albeit the fact that it was not amongst the most 
influential states.  
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This ‘transfer of leverage’ does not happen in the ICG, because of two reasons, i.e. 
Malaysia is not a member of the ICG and the ICG members tend to act on their own 
behalf. The relatively higher leverage of the ICG members, due to their respective 
capacity and contribution, only potentially makes Malaysia feel uneasy.  
 
Indonesia, holding the mandate as the chief mediator from the OIC, also got legitimate 
support from the other OIC members. There are advantages of working under the 
mandate of a well-established international organization, namely the mandate is more 
‘internationally’ legitimate and the behavior of all the members are more coordinated 
because they are bound by certain rules and norms of the organization. That also explains 
why, even though not very influential, Indonesia was accepted to lead the Committee of 
Six, besides other reasons. 
 
Even though Malaysia is the chief mediator in the peace process, it is not in a higher 
position than the ICG nor does it hold a legitimate recognition from the ICG members. 
Thus, the coordination amongst all individual mediators is more challenging than that of 
the OIC. This situation may weaken the mediator standing in general. Moreover, the 
relatively high leverage of the individual ICG member does not even allow the grouping 
to exert more influence on the peace talks, because it was established by the consent of 
both parties with a very strict mandate.  
 
In order for Malaysia and the ICG to mediate more effectively, a closer coordination is 
necessary, especially to integrate all the resources possessed by all the individual 
mediators. That way, the leverage of each IGC members may potentially be transformed 
into a higher mediator’s standing. With a higher standing, Malaysia as the chief mediator 
could have the flexibility in the strategy option and exert more influence on how the 
peace talks proceed, thus, would expedite the conclusion of a final peace agreement. 
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Annex 
 
Summary of Events 
 
 
The timeline below highlights the major events that are mentioned earlier in the chapters 
to give a concise illustration on how the conflict and, for the most part, mediation process 
have developed so far.* 
 
1971 The MNLF was established by Nur Misuari 
 
1972 Martial Law was declared by the Philippine government; the hostilities in the 
Southern Philippines grew 
 
1974 The OIC accepted the MNLF’s appeal and issued a Joint Communiqué calling 
for ‘a peaceful solution … within the framework of the national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Philippine.’  
 
1975 The formal talks between the GRP and MNLF started 
 
1976 The signing of the Tripoli Agreement; the Agreement quickly  
 
1977 The OIC granted the MNLF the observer status 
 
1978 The “new leadership” group declared separation from the MNLF 
 
1977-1983 High escalation of the GRP – MNLF armed conflict 
 
1984 The MNLF “new leadership” became MILF 
 
1984 - 1996 The GRP used military approach against the MILF and the newly 
emerged “terrorist” group Abu Sayyaf; the GRP often claimed the 
two groups linked closely 
 
1986 Revolt in the Philippines, Marcos stepped down from his Presidency, allowing 
the new administration to pursue more diplomatic approach with secessionist 
groups 
 
1987 The signing of the Jeddah Accord; the talks between the GRP and MNLF 
resumed 
 
1989 ARMM was created by the Philippine government, based on the Organic Act for 
the ARMM (Republic Act No. 6734 of 1988) 
 
1993 The first formal talks between the GRP and MNLF in Jakarta, Indonesia 
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1994 The second and third formal talks between the GRP and MNLF 
 
1996 The signing of the Final Peace Agreement between the GRP and MNLF 
 
1997 The beginning of negotiation between the GRP and MILF 
 
1998 The signing of general agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the GRP 
and MILF 
 
2000 The GRP under Estrada’s administration launched an “all-out-war” against the 
MILF 
 
2001 Malaysia joined as a mediator in the GRP – MILF talks 
 
2003 The GRP under Arroyo’s administration launched “Buliok offensive” targeting 
at the capture of MILF’s Salamat Hashim; the hostilities terminated by a 
ceasefire agreement in the same year 
 
2004 The IMT was established to monitor the ceasefire implementation on the ground 
 
2008 The GRP and MILF negotiation teams agreed upon the text of MOA-AD, but 
failed to sign due to the Philippine Supreme Court’s decision that the text was 
‘unconstitutional’, followed by the breakout of hostilities between both sides 
 
2009 The ICG was established to support the mediation process 
 
2010 The GRP requested Malaysian government to replace Dato’ Othman Abdul 
Razak as the chief mediator due to his ‘impartiality’ 
 
2011 Dato’ Othman Abdul Razak finally resigned and was replaced by Tengku Abdul 
Ghaffar Tengku Mohamad 
 
2012 The state of art while this thesis is written is that the GRP and MILF have agreed 
upon the Ten Decision Points on Principles as of April 2012 as a basis for further 
talks 
 
 
* Summarized from various sources 
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